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worker characteristics, i.e., human capital compensation 
(heterogeneous ability) and career mobility rationalities, 
job characteristics play a role in the mismatching variance 
and its real or apparent wage penalties.
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Qualifikatorisches (Mis)matching und die Ausnutzung 
von fachlichen Kenntnissen und Fähigkeiten von 
Erwerbstätigen in Deutschland: Zur Bedeutung von 
Personen- und Arbeitsplatzmerkmalen
Zusammenfassung Der Artikel bietet detaillierte Ergeb-
nisse zur Inzidenz und zu den Lohneinbußen von fehl-
qualifizierter Beschäftigung in Deutschland. Wir nutzen 
die BIBB/BAuA-Erwerbstätigenbefragung 2006, um zwei 
verschiedene Maße des Matchings zwischen Erwerbstäti-
gen und ihren Arbeitsplätzen zu berechnen. Ein erstes Maß 
zeigt eine formale Fehlqualifizierung an und beinhaltet, in-
wieweit das Niveau des erreichten beruflichen Bildungs-
abschlusses mit der qualifikatorischen Anforderung des 
Arbeitsplatzes übereinstimmt. Zweitens - und anders als 
die meisten anderen Studien - betrachten wir fähigkeits-
bezogenes Mismatching, das die Entsprechung zwischen 
den fachlichen Kenntnissen und Fähigkeiten der Erwerbs-
tätigen mit den Anforderungen des Arbeitsplatzes an diese 
widerspiegelt. Wir untersuchen, ob und inwieweit sich die 
Befunde zu Mismatching zwischen diesen Maßen unter-
scheiden und versuchen das Auftreten von Mismatching 
durch Merkmale der Erwerbstätigen und Arbeitsplätze zu 
erklären. Wir untersuchen weiterhin die mit fehlqualifizier-
ter Beschäftigung verbundenen Lohneinbußen in Deutsch-
land und berücksichtigen dabei eine große Zahl von Kon-
Abstract This paper provides precise figures on the inci-
dence and wage penalties of mismatching in Germany. We 
use the BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006 to compute 
two different measures of person-to-job matching. A first 
measure indicates an educational (mis)match, i.e., whether 
a worker’s attained level of education corresponds to the 
qualificational requirements of his or her job. Second, — 
and different from most other studies—we observe a skill 
(mis)match that reflects the correspondence between the 
skills of the job holder and the skill requirements of the 
job. We explore whether and the extent to which results 
on mismatch differ between these measures and explain 
the probability of being (mis)matched by different sets 
of worker and job characteristics. We also examine wage 
penalties for mismatching in Germany, considering a large 
number of controls for workers and, in addition to most 
earlier studies, job heterogeneity; we use random intercept 
models with workers nested in occupations. Our results 
indicate that large shares of over- or under-educated work-
ers in Germany have skills that correspond to the skill re-
quirements of their jobs. Furthermore, there are workers 
perfectly matched with respect to their education who, nev-
ertheless, feel under- or over-challenged by their jobs’ skill 
requirements. Random intercept models reveal that beyond 
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trollvariablen auf der Personenebene und - zusätzlich zu 
den meisten früheren Studien - die Heterogenität zwischen 
Arbeitsplätzen; wir verwenden Random-Intercept-Modelle 
mit Erwerbstätigen in Berufen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass große Anteile der formal Über- oder Unterqualifizier-
ten in Deutschland fachliche Fähigkeiten und Kenntnisse 
haben, die zu den Anforderungen des Arbeitsplatzes pas-
sen. Gleichzeitig gibt es Erwerbstätige, die formal passend 
qualifiziert beschäftigt sind, sich aber in Bezug auf ihre 
fachlichen Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten unter- oder überfor-
dert fühlen. Random Intercept-Modelle zeigen, dass über 
Eigenschaften der Erwerbstätigen hinaus, d.h. Humanka-
pital (heterogene Fähigkeiten) und berufliche Aufstiegs-
erwartungen, Arbeitsplatzmerkmale eine Rolle bei fehl-
qualifizierter Beschäftigung und ihren tatsächlichen oder 
scheinbaren Lohneinbußen spielen.
JEL Classification I21 · J23 · J24
1 Introduction
Mismatching, i.e., the missing correspondence between the 
skills of a job-holder and the skill requirements of his job, 
might have negative consequences for the worker himself 
(e.g., in the form of wage penalties or job dissatisfaction), 
for the firm in which he is employed, and for the national 
economy. As several authors have demonstrated, in most 
industrialized countries studied—including Germany—sub-
stantial fractions of the labor force seem to be over- or under-
qualified for their jobs. However, to date, there is no current 
in-depth information on the incidence rates and wage penal-
ties due to educational match and skill utilization in Germany.
Moreover, at least two recent findings justify research in 
the field. First, some studies see signs of an increase in over-
education in Europe (Korpi and Tåhlin 2009; Green 2006). 
As an analysis of the BIBB/IAB and BIBB/BAuA Employ-
ment Surveys 1979–2006 shows, there seem to be similar 
trends in Germany as well. The proportion of workers stat-
ing that their current job could also be performed by workers 
with lower qualifications declined from 1979 to 1985/1986 
and then increased through 1998/1999 within the population 
of West German full-time male workers aged 25 to 65. Simi-
larly, from 1998/99 to 2006, the proportion of workers who 
state that they generally feel under-challenged by the require-
ments of their current jobs compared with their skills has dou-
bled from 6 to 12 % (Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann 2011).
Second, studies using the task approach (Autor et al. 
2003) have formulated a re-fined version of the skill biased 
technological change hypothesis and characterized current 
skill demand trends as polarization.
Germany is a particularly good case for the study of mis-
matching. First, a central characteristic of the German skill 
system is its comparatively strong vocational orientation. 
For most vocational programs at the upper-secondary and 
tertiary levels, the emphasis lies on learning (occupation-) 
specific skills as such skills act as clear signaling devices for 
employees. Consequently, in Germany, access to most occu-
pational positions requires formal certification. Against that 
background, some argue that the German skill system is not 
able to adapt the amount and types of skills of their (future) 
workforce to the altered skill demands (Carnoy 2009). In 
contrast, others see the close links between the education 
and the employment systems as ensuring good coordination 
between skill demand and supply with comparatively low 
rates for mismatching (Büchel and Witte 1997; Daly et al. 
2000). Very recently, Verhaest and Van der Velden (2013), in 
a cross-national comparative study, find that countries that 
place high importance on specific orientation experience 
less overeducation in first jobs.
Second, in Germany, there is a specially designed survey 
for the study of educational mismatch and skill utilization. 
The BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006 (Hall and Tie-
mann 2009; Rohrbach-Schmidt 2009), using a sample size 
of 20,000 workers, provides for the rare opportunity to study 
mismatching based on multiple measures of respondents’ 
supply of (in)formal skills and their jobs’ skill requirements. 
While the data in this strand of literature do not allow for 
encountering the problem of omitted variable bias by fixed 
effects techniques (e.g., see Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011), 
in contrast to most earlier studies in Germany, we can con-
trol for a large amount of usually unobserved human capital, 
skill utilization and skill requirement measures.
This paper aims to contribute to the current literature by 
providing more actual and precise figures on the incidence 
rates and wage penalties of educational and skill-related mis-
matching in Germany. First, regarding the correspondence 
between workers’ skills and job requirements, in our analy-
ses we differentiate between educational and skill-related 
(mis)matching. Given the characteristics of the German skill 
system and the difficulties in determining and measuring 
workers’ skills and job requirements as such (Handel 2003), 
it seems valuable to consider the similarities and differences 
in ‘mis-education’ and ‘mis-skilling’. Second, there is lit-
tle knowledge on different sub-groups among mismatched 
workers (Korpi and Tåhlin 2009). Using the large German 
sample of workers, we examine decisive worker character-
istics of education and skill mismatched employees as well 
as job tasks and changes in skill requirements associated 
with their jobs. Thus, we link the task approach to the debate 
on mismatching in Germany. To see first, how much of the 
probability of being (mis)matched results from differences 
between occupations and workers, respectively, and second, 
which worker and job covariates have a share in mismatch-
ing, we run a set of logistic random intercept models. Third, 
we analyze wage penalties for mismatching in Germany, 
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discussion of the advantages of the dual system, see Dust-
mann and Schoenberg (2008)). Given the high participation 
rates in the apprenticeship program (and students in school-
based vocational education programs and advanced training 
programs in tertiary vocational colleges and academies), 
with approximately 25 % of the population’s respective age 
groups, tertiary academic graduation is not as common as it 
is in other industrialized countries (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2009, p. 19).
Turning from the supply side to the demand side, the 
question as to which types of skill requirements are grow-
ing versus declining is a controversial topic (Handel 2003, 
2008). Predominantly, there is the view that the demand for 
skills is monotonously rising, that is, the demand is rising 
for skilled workers and decreasing for unskilled workers 
(upgrading). This is largely based on the observation that in 
the 1980s, the US wage growth was monotone in wage per-
centiles (Acemoglu 2002; Morris and Western 1999). The 
common explanation for this upgrading trend is the rising 
computerization of labor due to falling computer prices and 
it has been termed skill-biased technical change (SBTC). 
However, in addition to a number of troubling facts related 
to the classical SBTC theory (Card and DiNardo 2002), 
the theory might be criticized for evaluating changes in the 
rewards for skills and changes in the between components 
of structural change (i.e., an increase in sectors, industries, 
and occupations) they are rather indirect measures of skills 
and are not sufficiently informative regarding the skill con-
tent of jobs3.
In response to the difficulty in capturing skill content 
using wage returns to education or occupational schemes 
as such, Autor et al. (2003), hereafter ALM, developed an 
approach that classifies jobs according to their core task 
requirements, namely, the main activities workers must per-
form at work, and relates these task requirements to formal 
and informal skills that the job-holder must possess to carry 
out these tasks. This new conceptual framework has been 
applied in the US and in some European countries (Autor et 
al. 2006, 2008; Goos et al. 2009; Spitz-Oener 2006; Green 
2012). One central contribution of the task approach was 
that a refined hypothesis regarding the link between com-
puterization (and offshoring, see Autor and Dorn (2009)) 
and skill demand change was formulated. Specifically, 
computerization could replace human labor in jobs where 
3 In general, the use of objective measures, such as occupational clas-
sifications (as realized matches by mean educational level) and expert 
ratings of occupational skill requirements, suffers from conflating 
supply and demand, or not capturing within-occupational hetero-
geneity, being less actual and possibly also less valid, e.g., because 
experts’ assessments are based on single raters or the unevaluated 
functional equivalence of occupational classification measures in 
cross-national applications. McGuinness (2006) and Hartog (2000) 
provide good overviews of advantages and drawbacks of different 
measures.
considering a large number of controls with respect to the 
worker and, in addition to most earlier studies, job hetero-
geneity exploiting random intercept models with workers 
nested in occupations. In particular, we test a job hetero-
geneity hypothesis against the human capital compensation 
hypothesis and, to the extent possible,1 the occupational 
mobility hypothesis for Germany. This paper is organized as 
follows. We first review available evidence on skill demand 
and supply (trends) and on mismatching in Germany. This is 
followed by a theoretical explanation of mismatching. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data and methods used. In the empirical 
section, we explore the incidence rates and wage penalties 
of mismatching in the German labor force using random 
coefficient models. The paper concludes with a short sum-
mary of the results.
2  Education, skills, and job requirements: theory and 
evidence
2.1  Skill supply, skill demand, and (mis)matching in 
Germany
Since the 1970s, there has been a sustained increase in 
enrollment rates and time spent in the educational system 
among the OECD population, including Germany (Hadjar 
and Becker 2009; OECD 2007). The German educational 
system2 is characterized by comparatively high levels of 
standardization and stratification, and compared with other 
countries, it is highly vocationally oriented. However, it 
has shown strong continuity during the second half of the 
20th century, providing a stable educational foundation for 
educational choices (Hillmert 2008, p. 59). Access to most 
occupational positions requires formal certification from a 
vocational institution at the upper secondary level (dual-/
school-based system of vocational education) or tertiary 
level (vocational colleges/academies, universities). A sig-
nificant portion of the working population, approximately 
60 %, have a vocational degree from an upper-secondary 
level institution as their highest degree and most were 
attained within the dual system, i.e., a (mostly) three-year 
apprenticeship training with part-time workplace training in 
firms and in state-provided vocational schools. The dual sys-
tem provides trainees with occupation-specific skills, grants 
employers a long screening period, and thus leads to com-
paratively smooth transitions of labor market entrants (for a 
1 Unfortunately, the in-depth matching information we are using is not 
available on a panel basis. In general, we see that an important con-
tribution to the literature would be to study individual change (e.g., 
see Hartog 2000).
2 For a detailed discussion of the German education system and an 
examination of how the International Standard Classification of Edu-
cation (ISCED-97) applies to it cf. Schneider (2008).
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both men and women regarding overqualification, with val-
ues of 17.5 % based on a measure of formal matching of edu-
cational attainment with required level of education using 
data from 1984 (Daly et al. 2000), 15.8 % using similar data 
from 1998 (Büchel and van Ham 2003), and 11.5 % using 
a standard deviation-based measure of educational levels 
in occupations with data from 1984 to 1998 (Bauer 2002). 
Daly et al. (2000) compare US and German panel data and 
find more similarities between countries at one point in time 
than within one country across time. They conclude that nei-
ther structural change nor institutional differences affect the 
returns to mismatching. A recent cross-national compara-
tive study on graduate overeducation conducted by Verhaest 
and Van der Velden (2013) shows that overeducation rates 
of German graduates 6 months after graduation are among 
the lowest in the 14 countries studied, but that they face an 
above average persistence of overeducation. With respect to 
trends, studies with comparable long-term data from Sweden 
(Korpi and Tåhlin 2009) and the UK (Green 2006) report an 
increase in overeducation. In an analysis of the BIBB/IAB 
and BIBB/BAuA Employment Surveys 1979–2006, we find 
similar growth trends of overqualification in Germany as 
well (Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann 2011). The Konsor-
tium Bildungsberichterstattung (2006, pp. 185 et seqq.) has 
shown that formal overqualification has increased for gradu-
ates from academic tertiary level institutions from 1984 and 
1995 to 2004 (19.8 %) in Germany and, currently, is slightly 
above the level of overqualification of graduates from upper 
secondary vocational education and training institutions 
(2004: 17.2 %).
Distinct from the determinants in countries’ overall lev-
els or incidence rates of mismatching, researchers have 
studied the earnings consequences of mismatching at the 
worker level, i.e., wage penalties resulting from over- or 
under-qualification. Based on the decomposition of attained 
education into required (RE), over- and under-qualifications 
(OE, UE) the ORU model was first presented in the work of 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981). Their study indicates that wage 
regressions reveal a stable pattern in the decomposed coeffi-
cients of education across time and countries (Hartog 2000; 
Rubb 2003a). That is, OE > 0, UE < 0, and |UE|<RE > OE, 
which suggest that ‘overeducated workers earn more than 
correctly matched workers in the same type of jobs…, but 
less than correctly matched workers with the same amount 
of education’ (Korpi and Tåhlin 2009, p. 184) and that 
there exists a converse pattern for undereducated workers5, 
respectively. This pattern challenges the human capital the-
ory, and thus, there is an ongoing debate on whether, in gen-
eral, mismatching is a real or an apparent phenomenon and 
5 Reviewing available cross-national evidence, Hartog (2000, p. 135) 
reports that differences in returns to UE would not always be statisti-
cally significant.
workers perform routine tasks, i.e., job tasks that follow 
precise, well-understood (codifiable) procedures. Typically, 
this process would erode the demand for mid-level skilled 
routine cognitive and manual activities, such as bookkeep-
ing, clerical work, and repetitive production tasks (ibid., 
routinization hypothesis). In contrast, technology would 
complement analytical and interactive non-routine job 
tasks typically performed by high-skilled workers, thereby 
leading to an increase in their relative demand. Finally, as 
low-skilled, non-routine manual tasks, such as truck driv-
ing and cleaning, are, as yet, not directly affected by com-
puterization (but see Frey and Osborne 2013), their relative 
demand is assumed to be increasing as well. Studies on the 
US (Autor et al. 2006), Great Britain (Goos and Manning 
2007) and some European countries (Goos et al. 2009) sug-
gest that since the 1990s, rather than upgrading, the relative 
demand trends for skills are better described as polariza-
tion (Spitz-Oener 2006), i.e., relative declines in mid-level 
skill jobs and relative increases in high- and low-skill jobs. 
Antonczyk et al. (2010) found evidence of employment 
polarization in Germany from 1989 to 2004. By analyzing 
wage trends, some have found that compared with other 
countries, in Germany, the increase at the bottom of the skill 
structure seems to be lower, thus indicating that the overall 
picture is one of polarized upgrading (Dustmann et al. 2009; 
Oesch and Rodriguez 2011).
The characteristics of the supply and (as controversially 
discussed) demand side and the problems with precisely 
measuring the two sides (cp. footnote 3) should be consid-
ered when reviewing studies on the incidence rates and wage 
penalties of mismatching. As an alternative to combining 
objective measures of skill demand, such as expert ratings 
and mean education level of occupations, with supply side 
information, some authors have directly asked respondents 
what level of education is required for their job and then 
compared this with their achieved level of education (edu-
cational mismatching), or researchers have directly asked 
whether respondents feel as if there is a mismatch (Green 
and McIntosh 2007). Compared to the US and UK, there 
are comparatively few studies on mismatching in Germany. 
Available studies reveal the following. While there are inter-
national averages of approximately 22 % for subjective and 
29 % for objective measures (McGuinness 2006)4, the few 
studies for Germany report relatively low average rates for 
4 McGuinness (2006) reviews 33 studies between 1969 and 2000 
from mostly Western countries, most of which present US and UK 
(and Britain) data, but they also include data for Holland, Germany, 
Greece, Spain, Canada, Portugal, (Northern) Ireland, and Hong Kong 
with a total of 62 estimates. Across studies in their meta-analysis, 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) find an average of 23.3 % of 
workers to be overeducated (based on 50 estimates) and 14.4 % to be 
under-qualified for their jobs (36 estimates). For a review of existing 
studies, also see Hartog (2000) and Quintini (2011).
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mental variables do not lead to substantial deviations from 
the above-described pattern. Equally, authors attempting to 
determine whether mismatching is largely a short-term phe-
nomenon arising from imperfect information or reflecting a 
strategy of labor market beginners for future wage growth 
(occupational mobility hypothesis) have met with rather 
disappointing results (Dolton and Vignoles 2000; Frenette 
2004; Korpi and Tåhlin 2009; Rubb 2003b). In a review 
of the available evidence, Hartog (2000, p. 139) reports 
that the incidence of mismatching typically decreases with 
increasing age and experience, whereas results for tenure are 
mixed. The latter is partly because it is not easy to separate 
effects from possible matching strategies from other char-
acteristics of labor market beginners (Büchel and Mertens 
2004). McGuinness criticizes that none of the studies con-
trols for cohort effects (McGuinness 2006, p. 411).
The mixed results regarding human capital compen-
sation and the occupational mobility hypothesis support 
the assumption that, at least to some extent, mismatching 
is a real phenomenon in labor markets. HCT links wages, 
schooling, and on-the-job training within an equilibrium 
model. Apparently, HCT, however, does not acknowledge 
the demand side or job characteristics (Hartog 2000; Lazear 
1995). Moreover, it fails to link the practicing of specific 
bundles of job activities to the skills these workers must 
have to meet demands (Autor and Handel 2013). In contrast, 
according to job competition and assignment models, the 
occurrence of mismatching is assumed to be a real phenom-
enon (Sattinger 1993; Thurow 1975).
First, these theories consider job heterogeneity to be 
opposed to or in addition to worker heterogeneity, and as 
such, it is relevant when considering mismatching. Herein, 
skill requirements, and thus wages, are also determined by 
the characteristics of the job, not solely by the qualifications 
of the worker. It is assumed that not only will some work-
ers be more or less able than other workers, but that jobs 
will be held by over- or undereducated workers who have 
higher (or lower) skill requirements than those observable 
simply by levels of education (Korpi and Tåhlin 2009). If 
this is the case, the inclusion of better measures for the skill 
requirements of jobs, such as task content and changes in 
requirements over time, in matching models would provide 
validation of the concept and measure of overqualification. 
In contrast to heterogeneous ability assumptions, one might 
assume that overqualification is less common in jobs char-
acterized by complex abstract tasks and sharp increases in 
skill requirements over time.
Second, in these other theories, mismatch is regarded as a 
real phenomenon where over- and underqualified individu-
als have jobs that are inappropriate for their skill levels and 
abilities. Job competition models suggest that for a given 
job opportunity, the allocation of a specific individual to that 
job is based on his relative position in the job queue, which 
on whether real mismatching can be explained satisfactorily 
(see the section below). In a review of studies from differ-
ent countries and time points on the effects of mismatching 
on wages, McGuinness (2006) finds large variance in the 
estimates for required education (4.8–14 %), overeduca-
tion (2.06–7.1 %) and undereducation (- 10.75–- 1.7) across 
studies. While Bauer (2002) and Daly et al. (2000) present 
measures for Germany as well, their implications for cur-
rent wage penalties in Germany give rise to skepticism. For 
instance, Bauer’s measurement seems to conflate supply 
and demand side information, and Daly et al. estimates are 
based on data from Germany in 1984. To our knowledge 
there is no accurate current estimate of the wage penalties 
from mismatching for Germany (cf. Quintini 2011).
2.2  Understanding the matching process: productivity, 
signaling, and self-selection
The existence of relevant proportions of each nation’s labor 
force being mismatched challenges classic human capital 
theory (HCT). To be consistent, either mismatching does not 
exist substantially and the above results are due to unobserved 
heterogeneity of workers caused by measurement errors or 
missing controls, such as abilities or skills in wage equations 
(e.g., see Green and McIntosh 2007), or the observed skill 
gaps are real but persist for only a short time (Sichermann 
and Galor 1990). In other words, either overeducated (under-
educated) workers are less (more) able than others with simi-
lar qualifications, and thus, they are in appropriate jobs with 
respect to their skills, or mismatching is part of a human 
capital investment strategy (Chevalier 2003). However, mis-
matching seems to be a prolonged disequilibrium as there are 
repeated findings of this phenomenon. If mismatching were 
only temporary, it could be integrated into HCT with the two 
above mentioned arguments.
Several authors have attempted to prove the consistency 
of HCT by using different measures for mismatching and by 
controlling for as many worker characteristics as possible. 
In fact, some results based on fixed effects models or on 
models with controls for ability or job satisfaction indicate 
that unobserved worker heterogeneity has a relevant role in 
explaining differences between match categories (Allen and 
van der Velden 2001; Bauer 2002; Chevalier 2003; Fren-
ette 2004; Green 2006; Green and McIntosh 2007). More 
recently, analyses from Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) of panel 
data from Sweden do not provide support for what they call 
the human capital compensation hypothesis. Moreover, the 
inclusion of ability and health measures does not affect HC 
variables, and the fixed effect models and the use of instru-
6 The authors report even negative values for overeducation and posi-
tive values for undereducation. However, we do not consider these 
implausible values in this study.
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individuals self-select into those jobs for which they have 
an offer that afford them the highest utility. Thus, as Green 
and McIntosh (2007) argue, some workers might choose the 
most appropriate job within reach based on their skills and 
given their time resources. In fact, Büchel and Battu (2003) 
have shown that married West German women living in rural 
areas exhibit higher odds of overqualification. Thus, as an 
alternative explanation to the imbalance of the supply and 
demand of workers, mismatching might result from labor 
market rigidities. Workers with specific family responsibili-
ties, such as caring for children or relatives, might, for exam-
ple, choose part-time jobs that are within their reach, even if 
these jobs are not perfectly matched to their skills.
In sum, previous research gives reason to assume that 
beyond human capital compensation and career mobility 
rationalities, job characteristics may help to explain mis-
matching and its real or apparent wage penalties. To test the 
validity of the worker and job heterogeneity assumptions 
as discussed herein, we empirically examine the incidence 
rates and wage penalties of mismatching in Germany. To 
this end, we differentiate between educational and skill-
related mismatching and consider several precise measures 
of worker and job characteristics.
3  Data, variables, and methods
3.1  Data and variables
In Germany, there is a survey designed specifically to assess 
mismatching that uses rich information collected via the job 
requirement approach (JRA). The BIBB/BAuA Employment 
Survey 20067 (Hall and Tiemann 2009) is a representative 
cross-sectional survey on qualifications and working condi-
tions in Germany. It includes information on respondents’ 
qualifications and career history as well as detailed job-related 
information, including organizational information, job tasks, 
job skill requirements, working conditions, health etc. With 
a sample size of 20,000, it also studies special social groups, 
such as older individuals, females, non-formally qualified 
workers, and workers with different national backgrounds, 
as well as developments within detailed occupations, indus-
tries and vocational fields. The study population is people 
who belong to the labor force, i.e., receive pay for work, who 
are aged 15 and over, and who have a regular work schedule 
of at least 10 h per week. The sampling design is a two-stage 
probability sampling with households as the primary sam-
pling units (Gabler-Häder sampling frame) and individuals 
7 There are four earlier cross-sectional surveys from 1979, 1985, 
1991/1992 and 1998/1999. A sixth Employment Survey has been 
fielded in 2011/2012 (Hall et al. 2015).
is determined by the value of his trainability as signaled to 
the employer by the applicant’s schooling and experience 
(Kalleberg 1996; Sørensen and Kalleberg 1981; Spence 
1973). As such, skills that are relevant for the job, to a large 
extent, are acquired during on-the-job training. From this 
perspective, educational overinvestment may result from an 
over- or undersupply of qualifications in the market. Within 
that framework, previously adequately matched work-
ers may suddenly find themselves undereducated and thus 
knocked down a few rungs in the labor market due to chang-
ing hiring standards. The placement of overeducated work-
ers in lower level occupations would thus lead to an increase 
in the mean educational level within these occupations 
(McGuinness 2006, p. 388). With respect to the UK, Goos 
and Manning (2007) argue that an increase in overeducation 
might result from the concurrence of the steady increase in 
educational attainment, the decrease in mid-level skill jobs, 
and the rising credentialism at the bottom of the occupa-
tional hierarchy (Goos and Manning 2007, p. 128–9). From 
this and similar polarization trends in Germany, one would 
assume a positive correlation of lower level occupations 
and overqualification in our data. Against the background 
of the ALM framework, one possibility to test this assump-
tion is to use job tasks instead of occupational level as the 
measures for skill requirements of jobs. Thus, because of a 
polarization trend in skill demand in Germany, workers in 
jobs characterized by cognitive or manual routine tasks and 
non-routine manual tasks should have higher odds of being 
mismatched with respect to their formal qualifications and 
skills than workers in jobs with higher level tasks.
Yet, especially for German vocational training certifi-
cates it is the case that graduates are equipped with surplus 
skills and competences they do not use in their specific held 
occupations (Lutz and Grünert 2003). ‘A vocational train-
ing occupation is defined as a bundle of qualifications that 
are learned, assessed and certified in an institutionalized 
training which enables the graduate to work in a number of 
similar occupations.’ (Tiemann 2015). Those trainings are 
regularly adapted to current developments and new require-
ments. Even if one of the occupational activities open for 
employees with a training certificate goes extinct, there 
are still other activities on the same qualification level the 
holder could change into. So, either workers would select 
to different jobs on the same level or the training would be 
adapted. So one might instead assume that many routine 
manual jobs might provide better protection against over-
qualification because jobs intensive in these tasks are often 
occupations that are trained in the German VET system with 
clearly defined skill requirements.
Further insight of assignment models indicates that they 
assume workers’ choices over job opportunities through util-
ity maximization strategies (Autor and Handel 2013; Mül-
ler et al. 2002; Sattinger 1993). According to this thinking, 
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ISCED-9711 with level B indicating vocational qualifications 
and virtual years of education12) and labor market experience 
in years (interview year minus years of employment gaps 
minus year of first employment13). Moreover, we use the 
information about the year since the worker began perform-
ing the current job-activity (task experience). We also con-
trol for a dummy measuring whether there was at least one 
employment gap in the respondent’s career (the length being 
included in labor market experience). To capture differences 
in productive capacity, we also consider the state of health, 
ranging from poor (1) to excellent/perfect (5).
In addition, we examine the role of job characteristics in 
mismatching. In this approach, we condition the self-assess-
ment of requirements, which may be biased, using objec-
tive information on the skill requirements of jobs. We use 
task measures for jobs that demand higher skills from work-
ers, such as analytic, interactive, non-routine job tasks, and 
medium to low skills, such as routine manual, routine cogni-
tive, and non-routine manual job tasks, each ranging from 
0 to 10014.We also aggregate these measures at the occu-
pational level to control for changing skill demand. More-
over, we include a dummy for workers’ responses when 
asked whether the skill requirements within their jobs have 
increased (with stability and decrease of requirements as the 
referent). We also include dummies for employment status 
(blue-collar (referent), white-collar, public servant, self-
employed, free-lancer15, helping family member), supervi-
11 ISCED level 3B (completed vocational education and training quali-
fication) also comprises graduates from 3B with additional post-sec-
ondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4). ISCED 5B includes master 
craftsmen, technicians, and workers with trade and technical school 
qualifications; ISCED 5A comprises university graduates.
12 Virtual years of education were computed by adding up the time it 
usually takes to achieve a certain degree. For example, to achieve a 
bachelor’s degree one would typically have attended general school 
for 13 years, of which nine are in secondary education, plus 3 years 
at a university. In sum, you would get a score of 16 years for virtual 
education.
13 Some respondents have accomplished, or at least started, more than 
one vocational education or training program. For some of these cases, 
the time of the first training episode had to be recomputed.
14 Each single task measure is the worker’s assessed number of activi-
ties performed in one category divided by the total number of activities 
in the category multiplied by 100. In contrast to former waves and thus 
to the procedures in Spitz-Oener (2006), it is possible to weight the 
number of activities by whether they are performed frequently (with a 
weight of 1), sometimes (with a weight of 0.5) or never (with a weight 
of 0). The categorization of single tasks to these tasks can be found in 
Table 8 of the appendix.
15 We are aware of the possible problems due to reporting errors of self-
employed or free-lancing workers on their income. We do measure 
gross earnings and find that self-employed and free-lancers show the 
highest mean income with the highest standard deviation. The imputa-
tion of missing cases in gross earnings is probably responsible for the 
high deviation. Self-employed and free-lancers are still included in the 
sample, though they will likely have distinct task-profiles.
as secondary sampling units (Kish sampling frame). The 
non-response rate was 56.0 %.
Whereas most studies rely on overeducation alone, the 
data used here allow for observing both educational and 
skills mismatch. To measure educational (mis)matching, 
we use the respondents’ educational attainment above com-
pulsory general education8 and the respondents’ assessment 
of the typical qualifications required to perform their cur-
rent job9. The ordinal categories, from lowest to highest, 
are as follows: no vocational education and no training 
qualification; completed dual/school-based vocational edu-
cation and training (VET) qualification; master craftsman 
or technician qualification or trade and technical school 
qualifications; university qualification. These categories 
are surveyed using the same wording in both questions. 
In this way, the matching categories can be computed eas-
ily10. In addition to the overall indicator variable, in some 
of our wage models, we include specific ORU variables 
for the categorically different German vocational degrees 
to indicate whether a respondent is overeducated with a 
completed vocational education and training qualification, 
with a university degree, etc. To measure skill mismatching, 
we rely on workers’ subjective assessment of mismatching. 
Respondents were asked whether they generally feel they 
are comfortable with, overchallenged, or underchallenged 
by the requirements of their current job given their occupa-
tional knowledge and skills. In contrast to formal matching, 
this measure more closely reflects the degree of matching 
between the skills and the knowledge of the job holder and 
the job’s skill requirements.
Against the background of the above discussed theo-
ries, as regards worker heterogeneity, we include the socio-
demographic variables, i.e., age cohort, sex, marital status, 
children living in the household, migration background (not 
having learnt German as a first language), and place of resi-
dence (East vs. West Germany). Human capital variables 
include highest educational degree achieved (reclassified in 
8 If respondents do not have vocational qualification or tertiary-level 
qualification, they are classified as having ‘no vocational education 
and training qualification’.
9 Respondents were asked, “What kind of qualification is usually 
required to perform your job as a <current main job>?”
10 The typically required vocational education was adjusted with infor-
mation on how long it takes to get acquainted with the job’s tasks and 
whether special courses had to be visited, where a typical threshold 
is 1 year of further education. This is due to possible misunderstand-
ings of the difference between courses leading to a technician or mas-
ter’s degree and courses giving extra skills but no formal qualification. 
There are also some certificates for technicians that might be awarded 
through vocational education. On the other hand, there are a number 
of surveying positions held by formally underqualified employees. It is 
also the case that some academically trained employees do not realize 
that vocational education was required for their jobs, albeit their aca-
demic qualification was the requirement. In these cases, the required 
vocational education was adjusted accordingly.
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Mean Std.dev Min Max
Overqualified 0.18 0.38 0 1
Overskilled 0.13 0.33 0 1
ISCED 3B (Vocational education and training qual.) 0.63 0.48 0 1
ISCED 5B (Master craftsmen, technicians, trade/technical school qual.) 0.07 0.26 0 1
ISCED 5A (University degree) 0.30 0.46 0 1
Required Education (RE)
RE—no vocational degree 0.09 0.28 0 1
RE - 3B 0.58 0.49 0 1
RE - 5B 0.07 0.25 0 1
RE - 5A 0.27 0.44 0 1
Overeducated (OE)
OE - 3B 0.08 0.27 0 1
OE - 5B 0.04 0.19 0 1
OE - 5A 0.06 0.24 0 1
Undereducated (UE)
UE - 3B 0.05 0.22 0 1
UE - 5B 0.01 0.08 0 1
Log hourly wages 2.76 0.49 - 0.24 5.66
Females 0.49 0.50 0 1
Age cohort
25–34 0.24 0.43 0 1
35–44 0.38 0.49 0 1
45–54 0.27 0.45 0 1
55–64 0.11 0.31 0 1
Kid(s) living in the household 0.47 0.50 0 1
German not learnt as a first language 0.05 0.21 0 1
Married 0.57 0.50 0 1
Residence in East Germany 0.19 0.40 0 1
Virtual education (yrs.) 0 2.46 - 4.27 3.23
Labor force experience (yrs.) 0 10.0 - 18.8 30.7
Employment gap 0.54 0.50 0 1
Task experience (yrs.) 0 7.78 - 8.56 35.4
Health
1 = Very bad 0.01 0.12 0 1
2 0.08 0.27 0 1
3 0.53 0.50 0 1
4 0.26 0.44 0 1
5 = Excellent 0.11 0.31 0 1
Non-routine analytic job tasks 0 25.9 - 56.0 44.0
Non-routine interactive tasks 0 30.2 - 58.5 41.5
Routine cognitive job tasks 0 30.9 - 35.0 65.1
Routine manual job tasks 0 28.6 - 34.0 66.0
Non-routine manual job tasks 0 26.4 - 21.1 78.9
Increase in job skill requirements 0.56 0.50 0 1
Shift work 0.23 0.42 0 1
Part-time job 0.23 0.42 0 1
Non-routine analytic job tasks (occ. mean) 0 15.6 - 37.3 23.8
Non-routine interactive tasks (occ. mean) 0 17.0 - 35.9 38.7
Routine cognitive job tasks (occ. mean) 0 9.8 - 13.0 35.1
Routine manual job tasks (occ. mean) 0 17.9 - 18.2 41.1
Non-routine manual job tasks (occ. mean) 0 14.0 - 11.4 39.5
Increase in job skill req. (occ. mean) 0 9.0 - 30.5 15.8
Ni 14,266
Sample excludes workers aged 15–24 and 65 + and workers without a vocational degree (for detailed sample definition see Sect. 3.1). 
All continuous level-1 and level-2 variables are centered around their (grand) mean (see Sect. 3.2)
Table 1 Descriptive statistics. (Source: BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006)
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where Yij = Logit(pij), pij = P(yij = 1 | xij, z), and logit(pij) = ln 
pij/1- pij in the logistic case; where workers i (ni = 14,266, i.e. 
7,268 for men and 6,998 for women) are nested in occu-
pations j (nj = 25 with  and , and mean 
); where regression coefficients are denoted by 
g; where (X) denotes explanatory variables at the worker-
level; (Z) denotes the occupation-level; u0j, u1j, eij are the 
residual error terms at the occupation and the worker levels, 
respectively, with a mean of zero; and where u0j, u1j are inde-
pendent of eij.
In both regressions, we use variable information as previ-
ously described herein. All continuous level-1 and level-2 
variables are centered around their (grand) mean. To sepa-
rate within- and between-effects of occupational character-
istics, job variance at the worker level (job task groups) is 
also aggregated at the occupation level (ISCO-88 sub-major 
groups (two-digit)). Explicitly, modeling the multilevel 
structure of the data as a system of regression equations in 
which the lowest level variable is simultaneously regressed 
on covariates from all existing levels, the multilevel mod-
els17 satisfy statistical and conceptual adequacy (Hox 2002; 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002). We estimate the probabilities of mismatching and the 
mismatching penalties using the xtmelogit (adaptive Gauss-
ian quadrature and seven integration points) and the xtmixed 
command in Stata, respectively. For mismatching models 
we report average marginal effects (discrete changes in 
case of factor variables) in addition to factor changes (odds 
ratios).
17 In the economic literature, multilevel models are also known as ran-
dom coefficient models or mixed models.
sor, part-time, or shift work and firm size, with categories 
ranging from 1 to 11 (1500 employees). With respect to out-
comes from (mis)matching, we examine wage penalties (log 
hourly gross income as a dependent variable16).
We restrict the analysis to workers aged 25–64 in order to 
focus on prime-aged employees whose labor force participa-
tion is high. With this, 1209 cases are dropped from the total 
sample. We also drop observations with their job’s economic 
sector being a private household or a sector not else classi-
fied (n = 382). To further strengthen the analysis we restrict 
the sample to 2-digit occupations with a least 50 cases (three 
occupational sub-major groups and 48 cases are dropped). 
First, we characterize the incidence of educational and skill 
mismatch in this core workforce population (n = 18,361). 
Second, we estimate several multivariate models of mis-
matching and wages. In these models, only those cases are 
considered that can in principle be at risk of overqualifica-
tion, i.e. workers with at least an ISCED 3B (2nd level of 
vocational education) certificate. Thus, another 1245 cases 
with ISCED 0, 2A, 2B and 3A are excluded. Finally, only 
cases with information on all variables considered in the 
matching and wage models enter the estimation (n = 14,266).
Because of women’s unstable labor market participa-
tion over their lifecycle all models are estimated for men 
(n = 7,268) and women (n = 6,998) separately (tables on 
request). We report decisive differences to the pooled analy-
ses in the results section.
Table 1 includes summary statistics for main variables 
used in the multivariate analyses.
3.2  Methods
To test for the assumption that above worker characteristics 
job heterogeneity has a role in explaining a mismatch, we 
run a set of multivariate models of mismatching and wages 
where we explicitly control for variance at the occupation 
level. First, with (mis)matching as the dependent variable, 
we regress the probability of being (mis)matched on worker 
and job variables simultaneously within a random intercept 
logistic regression model with workers nested in occupa-
tions. In the same vein, in the second part, we calculate 
wage penalties from mismatching in a random intercept lin-
ear model for workers within occupations. The model is 
written as:
16 We use imputed values for cases with missing information on the 
original self-reported gross monthly earnings variable (Alda and Rohr-
bach-Schmidt 2011).
Table 2 Educational and skills (mis)match. (Source: BIBB/BAuA 
Employment Survey 2006)











Sample excludes workers aged 15–42 and 65+ (for detailed sample 
definition see Sect. 3.1. Figures are weighted by survey weight
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Germany can also be mismatched in terms of their educa-
tion, even though their skills or abilities are, in fact, appro-
priate for the jobs they do. Additionally, there are workers 
who are perfectly matched with regards to the educational 
requirements, yet nevertheless, they feel under- or over-
challenged by their jobs’ skill requirements. Based on this 
decomposition, 60.4 % of workers are matched, 24.7 % are 
overqualified and 10.1 % are underqualified. Ultimately, 
these descriptive results indicate that mismatching rates 
in Germany are comparatively low, particularly compared 
with those of Anglo-Saxon countries (cf. McGuinness 2006; 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000).
To see whether the self-reported mismatching measures 
capture the two intended dimensions of mismatching, we 
inspect the decomposed matching categories by worker and 
job characteristics18. Overall, the measures are validated. 
Most notably, the breakdowns of mismatching for differ-
ent ISCED-levels (highest level attained) confirm certain 
decisive matching patterns in Germany. First, workers with 
a completed vocational education and training qualifica-
tion (ISCED 3B, 64 % matched), and university graduates 
(ISCED 5A, 67 % matched) perform equally well in obtain-
ing a job for which they are ‘really’ matched. A lower level 
degree from the VET system (ISCED 3B), which equips 
individuals with specific human capital, involves lower rates 
of mismatching than higher-level degrees of general educa-
tion (3A, 23 % ‘really’ matched). This clearly emphasizes 
the position of the VET system in Germany. Lower (higher) 
educated workers have above average shares of underedu-
cation (overeducation), but medium and low qualified work-
ers claim to underutilize their skills more often than workers 
with a tertiary level degree. Notable differences within the 
matching categories also emerge with regard to job tasks. In 
jobs characterized by complex abstract tasks and a sharp rise 
in skill requirements over time, educational mismatching is 
18 Bivariate statistics for mismatching by socio-demographic variables 
and several human capital variables as well as by job characteristics 
can be requested from the authors.
4 Results
4.1 Incidence and determinants of formal and skill-based 
mismatching in Germany
Table 2 plots separately the incidence of formal and skill-
based mismatching. We see that matching in terms of skills 
at 82.4 % is more frequent than formal matching at 71.4 %. 
For both measures, there are larger shares of workers with 
education and skills above rather than below the required 
level. Pearson’s chi-squared indicates that the mismatch-
ing measures are significantly related, but with a value of 
Cramér’s V of .10 the relationship between the variables 
is rather low. This parallels the findings for Dutch and UK 
data (Green and McIntosh 2007). Cross-tabulating both 
matching measures (cf. Table 3) confirms that, to a sizable 
extent, the different types of (mis)matching are independent 
of one another (for a similar approach see Green and Zhu 
2010): Real mismatches, i.e., overqualification or under-
qualification in both educational and skills-based terms, are 
extremely rare in Germany at 4.3 % and 0.6 %, respectively. 
A larger share of workers is inappropriately employed with 
respect to their formal qualifications at 13.6 % and 8.4 %. 
A skill-based mismatch without an educational mismatch 
occurs less frequently (7.7 % and 3.3 %). Thus, as Green 
and McIntosh (2007) demonstrated for the UK, workers in 
Table 4 Variance composition of match categories in intercept-only 

























ICC 0.228 0.148 0.236 0.082 0.056 0.005
Ni 14,266 14,266 14,266 14,266 14,266 14,266
Nj 25 25 25 25 25 25
ICC = Fraction of total variance in each mismatching category that 
is due to occupation-level variance (  with s.e. in parentheses)
Sample excludes workers aged 15–24 and 65 + and workers without a 
vocational degree (for detailed sample definition see Sect. 3.1)
Table 3 Two-way cross-tabula-
tion of educational and skill (mis)
match. (Source: BIBB/BAuA Em-
ployment Survey 2006. Sample 
excludes workers aged 15–24 and 
65+ (for detailed sample defini-
tion see Sect. 3.1). Figures are 
weighted by survey weight)
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Table 5 Random intercept model of overeducation (n = 14,266). (Source:BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006)
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fication. For both dependent variables, we extend the inter-
cept-only models by different sets of variables (Tables 5 and 
6). First, we include a variety of socio-demographic vari-
ables and variables reflecting worker human capital (models 
1). In this study, female workers have higher odds of being 
formally overeducated (+ 11.3 %), whereas (as for overskill-
ing) having children and a migration background do not 
additionally attract significant coefficients in the pooled 
sample. As a separate model for males reveals, males who 
did not learn German as their first language on average have 
a 6.8 % higher probability of overeducation. Similarily, an 
employment gap is positively related to the risk of overedu-
cation in the pooled and the male sample.
Therefore, to identify evidence of the occupational 
mobility hypothesis within these human capital models, 
we also include age cohorts. In contrast to the assumption 
that mismatching is just a temporary phenomenon and part 
of a career mobility strategy of labor market entrants, our 
results reveal that younger workers do not have a higher 
probability of being overeducated20. With specific human 
capital (task experience) and health reflecting productiv-
ity, we test the human capital compensation (heterogeneous 
ability) assumption, i.e., whether task experience and health 
have a share in mismatching and, thus, whether overedu-
cated workers are, in fact, less capable in their jobs than 
are others. The results for both measures seem to support 
this assumption. Moreover, for a mean level of years of 
education the risk of overeducation is substantially lower 
for workers with ISCED 3B qualifications as compared 
to university graduates. At the same time, the probability 
decreases with additional years of education.
20 Instead, for female employees aged 35–44 have a 3.1 % higher prob-
ability of overeducation than those of age 24–34. Possibly this signals 
processes of re-entering the labor market after family related breaks.
lower than it is in lower level jobs. In addition, analyses of 
occupational groups reveal that lower occupational groups 
(ISCO-88 main groups 8 and 9) are particularly character-
ized by formal and skill-based overqualification.
To see whether the patterns hold when we control for the 
other variables, we exploit multivariate models of education 
and skill mismatch. Specifically, we run random intercept 
models that allow us to assess how much of the probabil-
ity of being mismatched results from differences between 
workers and occupations. Table 4 shows the results from 
six empty models (intercept-only models) for each category 
of both mismatching measures where each includes the two 
other categories as the referent. The intraclass-correlation 
(ICC) informs about the relative share of the level-2 vari-
ance in total variance, i.e., the fraction in the probability 
of being mismatched maximal resulting from differences 
between occupations (two-digit ISCO-88). Cleary, there is 
more variance due to differences between occupations in the 
probability of educational mismatch than skills mismatch. 
Thus, broadly speaking, educational mismatch is more 
strongly linked to occupations, while the risk of skill mis-
match in large parts only varies by worker characteristics19. 
Approximately 23 % of the differences in the risk of over-
education and approximately 8 % of the differences in the 
risk of overskilling are due to occupational heterogeneity. 
This suggests that with respect to mismatching, occupation 
or job-related explanations might reasonably complement 
worker- or human capital-based approaches.
Against the background that, empirically, the incidence 
rates of overeducation and overskilling are above under-
qualification and underskilling, we restrict our attention to 
the determinants of educational and skill-based overquali-
19 The ICC for undereducation (but not for the other mismatching cat-

































Intraclass-correlation (ICC) 0.511 0.111 0.334 0.094
Log-likelihood - 4740.2 - 5921.1 - 4193.7 - 4176.0
Models with job characteristics additionally control for supervisor status, firm size and employment status. t-values (robust standard errors) in 
parentheses
Sample excludes workers aged 15–24 and 65 + and workers without a vocational degree (for detailed sample definition see Sect. 3.1)
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-sided test)
Table 5 (continued)  
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(1)O.R. AME/ 
DC
(2)O.R. AME/DC (3)O.R. AME/
DC
(4)O.R. AME/DC






















ISCED (Ref.: 5A, univers. deg.)

































































































































































N.-r. analytic job tasks (occ. mean) 0.986
(- 1.95)
- 0.0015
N.-r. interactive job tasks (occ. mean) 0.996
(- 0.74)
- 0.0005
Table 6 Random intercept model of overskilling (n = 14,266). (Source: BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006)
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workers were bumped down in the labor market and thus 
became overeducated. Generally, this is an assumption 
about trends which is hard to test with cross-sectional data. 
However, consistent with this assumption cognitive routine 
tasks and non-routine manual tasks increase the risk of over-
education but not overskilling (model 4). Finally, with some 
plausibility from labor market rigidities assumptions, job 
characteristics such as part-time or shift work are positively 
related to overeducation and overskilling (the latter, how-
ever, is not significant for females). Accordingly, we con-
clude that some overeducated workers might have chosen 
a less demanding job because it was the only job available 
given their time resources.
When both sets of variables are included in one model 
(model 3), there are no substantial changes in any of the 
human capital or job-related measures. From this, we con-
clude that both causes of heterogeneity have their inde-
pendent share in the variance of overeducation, thereby 
strengthening support of the job heterogeneity hypothesis. 
Model 4 additionally includes the job skill requirements of 
the occupation. Again, the magnitudes of all human capital 
and job variables are only slightly reduced, if at all. Over 
and above the partial effects from worker and job character-
istics, the skill content of occupations, i.e., the typical skill 
requirements of occupations, do affect the risk of overedu-
cation. Independent of the workers’ job task requirements, 
being in an occupation that is characterized by high levels 
of analytic and interactive tasks and routine manual tasks is 
related to lower risks of overeducation. Actually, the risk is 
substantially higher the more the occupation relies on non-
routine manual tasks. Except for analytic and manual routine 
tasks for female workers (odds ratio <1), the occupational 
skill requirements do not affect the risk of overskilling.
Overall, first, the multivariate results stress that, to some 
extent, overeducation and overskilling are distinct phenom-
ena in Germany. Some decisive covariates have opposite 
The relationships between the socio-demographic and 
human capital variables and overeducation do not hold for 
the overskilling models (Table 6). First, the risk of feeling 
under-challenged by job skill requirements does not differ 
between ISCED groups, males and females, migrants and 
natives (but for male migrants it is + 5.2 %), and workers 
with or without an employment gap. Moreover, being under-
challenged by the skill requirements of the job is statistically 
significantly lower for East German residents (- 2.9 %), mar-
ried workers (- 2.2 %) and workers aged 45–54 as well as 
55–64 compared with workers of age 25–34. As found in 
other studies (Hartog 2000), these results support the occu-
pational mobility argument. While results for task experience 
are consistent with the human capital compensation hypoth-
esis (experienced workers have lower risks of overskilling), 
controlling for other human capital measures, health differ-
ences do not matter for overskilling (though z-values are at 
the edge of statistical significance, especially in the female 
sample).
Models 2–4 demonstrate that, more so than human capi-
tal variables, job characteristics play a role in differences in 
mismatching categories. First, the more the job is character-
ized by high-skill, non-routine analytic tasks and increases 
in skill requirements over the last 2 years, the lower the risk 
of both, overeducation and overskilling. This could mean 
that jobs held by overeducated workers have higher skill 
requirements than can be observed by educational levels, 
a postulation that favors the job heterogeneity assumption. 
The risk of overeducation or overskilling is also reduced by 
routine manual tasks, which is consistent with the assump-
tion that these middle-skilled routine jobs better protect 
against overqualification because most of these occupations 
are trained in the German VET system and have clearly 
defined skill requirements. In the assignment models, we 
suggested that overeducation might result from a decrease 
in middling jobs such that formerly adequately matched 
(1)O.R. AME/ 
DC
(2)O.R. AME/DC (3)O.R. AME/
DC
(4)O.R. AME/DC
Routine cognitive job tasks (occ. mean) 0.998
(- 0.38)
- 0.0002
Routine manual job tasks (occ. mean) 0.995
(- 1.64)
- 0.0005
Non-routine manual job tasks (occ. mean) 0.994
(- 1.29)
- 0.0006
Increase in job skill req. (occ. mean) 0.996
(- 0.48)
- 0.0004
Intraclass-correlation (ICC) 0.090 0.033 0.038 0.006
Log-likelihood - 5262.6 - 5265.9 - 5177.4 - 5160.7
Models with job characteristics additionally control for supervisor status, firm size and employment status. t-values (robust standard errors) in 
parentheses
Sample excludes workers aged 15–24 and 65 + and workers without a vocational degree (for detailed sample definition see Sect. 3.1)
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-sided test)
Table 6 (continued)  
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UE: 3B - 0.036*
(- 2.22)
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Table 7 Random intercept model of log hourly wages (n = 14,266). (Source: BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006)
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ity, i.e., overeducated (undereducated) workers are assumed 
to be less (more) able than other workers with the same 
education. Alternatively, observed mismatching would be 
rather a short-term phenomenon and thus would disappear 
with occupational mobility. In contrast, in assignment mod-
els, it is assumed that skill requirements and thus wages are 
strongly determined by the (characteristics of the) job, not by 
the human capital of workers (alone). To further investigate 
the validity of these hypotheses, we examine wage penalties 
of mismatching using random coefficient models (Table 7).
The empty model estimates a mean log hourly wage of 
2.68 (approximately 15 €). About 32 % of the total variance 
in wages results from differences between occupations, and 
thus, 68 % is due to differences at the worker level. In model 
1, to test whether the basic ORU pattern is also valid for 
effects on educational- and skill-based overqualification, 
indicating that those who are overeducated are not neces-
sarily those who are overskilled, and vice versa. Second, the 
models indicate that over and above worker heterogeneity, 
job heterogeneity has an independent share in explaining 
overqualification. In addition to the regression coefficients, 
this is also reflected in the fit statistics. This especially 
applies for overeducation, where the error variance is 
strongly reduced when job heterogeneity is considered.
4.2 Wage penalties from mismatching and job 
heterogeneity
From the human capital compensation hypothesis, mis-
matching is largely due to unobserved worker heterogene-





































Non-routine analytic job tasks (occ. mean) 0.002
(1.05)
Non-routine interactive tasks (occ. mean) 0.003
(1.90)
Routine cognitive job tasks (occ. mean) - 0.003*
(- 2.21)
Routine manual job tasks (occ. mean) 0.00
(1.26)
Non-routine manual job tasks (occ. mean) - 0.00
(- 1.86)














Intraclass-correlation (ICC) 0.155 0.168 0.170 0.162 0.090 0.027
R2 occupation-level 0.713 0.668 0.672 0.697 0.860 0.961
R2 worker-level 0.247 0.221 0.223 0.249 0.320 0.320
R2 total (weighted by ICC) 0.319 0.297 0.299 0.321 0.369 0.337
Log-likelihood - 5594.6 - 5834.5 - 5820.0 - 5580.8 - 4860.2 - 4846.5
All models include age cohort. Models with job characteristics additionally control for economic sector, supervisor status, firm size and 
employment status. t-values (robust standard errors) in parentheses
Sample excludes workers aged 15–24 and 65 + and workers without a vocational degree (for detailed sample definition see Sect. 3.1)
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-sided test)
Table 7 (continued)  
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unobserved) ability differences between workers. Though 
both variables significantly vary with wages in the expected 
way, against the heterogeneous ability hypothesis, the par-
tial wage effects from over- and undereducation do not 
change significantly. Moreover, model 4 reveals that intro-
ducing additional worker-level variables, (i.e., part-time job 
- 12.0 %, shift work + 3.1 %) does not alter the pattern.
Model 5 includes job-related variables of the skill con-
tent of jobs, employment status, and firm size (the latter two 
are not printed). If jobs held by the over- or undereducated 
would be more skill demanding than could be observed 
by educational level, while holding constant skill utiliza-
tion, wage penalties from mismatching should be strongly 
reduced when we add better measures for the skills content 
of jobs. In fact, the effects from educational mismatching 
do not dissolve but significantly decline by nearly 5 per-
centage points each when jobs’ tasks are included. Model 5, 
which includes job-related variables, is a far superior fit, and 
it strongly reduces error variance at both the occupational 
level and the worker level.
Model 6 extends model 5 by incorporating certain occu-
pation level variables. We tested whether the skill profiles 
of occupations have significant effects on wages, over and 
above the effects of the skill profiles of workers’ jobs. First, 
in addition to the wage-increasing analytic and interactive 
task effect and the wage-decreasing effects of routine and 
non-routine manual tasks at the worker-level (job effects), 
the more the occupation is characterized by routine cogni-
tive tasks, the lower is the worker’s income. Thus, having a 
job with a higher level of interactive tasks might be devalued 
by being positioned in an occupation intensive in cognitive 
routine tasks. Second, it is noted that even with the level-2 
covariates, the basic patterns in wage penalties, from educa-
tional and skill-based mismatching, are largely unaffected. 
This, again, fosters the assumption that, to a certain extent, 
mismatching is a real phenomenon in the German labor 
market.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides actual and precise information on the 
incidence rates and wage penalties of educational match and 
skill utilization in Germany. Our analyses are based on the 
large-scale BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2006, which 
offers rich information on workers’ human capital and the 
skill requirements of their jobs. First, we demonstrate that, at 
present, as in other industrialized countries, mismatching is a 
relevant phenomenon in the German labor market. Depend-
ing on the definition of mismatching, up to 40 % of the Ger-
man labor force is mismatched with regards to either the 
educational or skill requirements of their jobs, or both. As in 
Germany, we introduce the decomposed ORU measures 
of educational mismatching for each vocational degree 
and several worker related variables. In fact, we observe 
that the ORU pattern holds for Germany even when con-
trolling for several human capital and socio-demographic 
variables. The overeducation coefficients are significantly 
positive, while the undereducation coefficients are nega-
tive21. Thus, overeducated (undereducated) workers of each 
qualification level earn more (less) than those with required 
levels of education in the same type of jobs, but less (more) 
than correctly matched workers with the same amount of 
education. Moreover, the absolute value of returns for each 
qualification group is higher for overeducation than it is for 
undereducation. Together, the ORU model explains approx-
imately 71 % of the wage differences between occupations 
and approximately 25 % of the wage differences between 
workers. Thus, nearly three quarters of the differences at 
the occupation level is due to the different composition of 
workers within occupations (sorting effect).
Second, we run a set of models with regressors for educa-
tional (model 2) and skill-based mismatching (model 3). As 
in the ORU model, model 2 includes standard human capi-
tal and socio-demographic variables. As we cannot observe 
wage growth with our data, our strategy to assess the valid-
ity of the occupational mobility hypothesis is to see whether 
there are mismatching penalties when controlling for age 
cohorts and labor market experiences. Results show that, on 
average, compared with workers with the same education, 
overeducated workers earn approximately 22.9 % less than 
matched workers, and undereducated workers earn 13.9 % 
more than workers with jobs that require lower qualifica-
tions. Thus, it is concluded that there are substantial wage 
penalties from mismatching in Germany when several 
human capital variables are considered.
As in Green and McIntosh (2007), in model 3, we intro-
duce over- and underskilling to see whether the coefficient 
for overeducation is reduced. However, the reason that the 
overeducated earn less does not seem to be that they are not 
using their skills and abilities to the same extent than matched 
workers with the same education. On the contrary, we find 
that these skill mismatching variables leave the educational 
mismatching variables almost unaffected. Over- and under-
educated workers earn approximately 22.6 % less and 14 % 
more, respectively, than correctly matched workers, when 
controlling for the extent of skill under- and overutilization.
To see whether the over- and undereducated earn less 
(more) because they are less (more) able than matched work-
ers, in model 4, we additionally include specific human cap-
ital (task experience) and health, two measures for (usually 
21 As reported in other studies on under-qualification in general, the 
coefficients for undereducated workers with a German ‘Meister’ or 
technical degree are not significantly different from zero.
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Deutschland. Die fehlende Passung der Qualifikationen 
und Kenntnisse von Erwerbstätigen mit den Anforderun-
gen der Arbeitsplätze ist mit negativen Konsequenzen für 
die Erwerbstätigen (etwa in Form von geringerer Arbeitszu-
friedenheit und geringen Löhnen), sowie für die betroffenen 
Firmen und damit auch die Gesamtwirtschaft verbunden. 
Zudem zeigen Studien, dass das Ausmaß von Überqualifi-
zierung in einigen Ländern, darunter Deutschland, in den 
letzten Dekaden zugenommen hat (Korpi und Tahlin 2009; 
Green 2006, für Deutschland Rohrbach-Schmidt und Tie-
mann 2011). Weiterhin geben Arbeiten zum Tätigkeitsansatz 
Anlass zu einer Untersuchung von Fehlqualifizierung, 
insofern, als dass hiermit die Bedeutung der Tätigkeitsin-
halte von Arbeitsplätzen bzw. Berufen für das Verständnis 
von Qualifikationsanforderungen und Löhnen verbunden ist 
(Autor et al. 2003).
Deutschland bietet vor diesem Hintergrund einen 
besonders guten Anwendungsfall für die Untersuchung 
von Fehlqualifizierungen. Zum einen ist das deutsche Bil-
dungs- und Beschäftigungssystem aufgrund einer starken 
beruflichen Orientierung durch eine enge Verzahnung von 
Qualifikationen und Beschäftigung und damit einem eher 
geringem Ausmaß von Fehlqualifikationen gekennzeich-
net (Büchel und Witte 1997; Daly et al. 2000, für eine län-
dervergleichende Analyse siehe die Studie von Verheast und 
Van der Velden 2013). Zum anderen liegen mit den Daten 
der BIBB/BAuA-Befragung 2006 Forschungsdaten für 
20.000 Erwerbstätige vor, die insbesondere den Erwerb und 
die Verwertung von beruflichen Qualifikationen zum Inhalt 
haben sowie Informationen zu den Tätigkeitsinhalten der 
Arbeitsplätze beinhalten. Die Daten enthalten neben Infor-
mationen zur Passung des Qualifikationsniveaus der Erw-
erbstätigen mit den formalen Qualifikationsanforderungen 
des Arbeitsplatzes auch Angaben dazu, inwieweit die fachli-
chen Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten der Erwerbstätigen mit den 
fachlichen Anforderungen am Arbeitsplatz übereinstimmen. 
Wir machen uns diese Angaben zunutze und untersuchen, a) 
inwieweit beide Formen der Passung zusammenhängen, b) 
welche Eigenschaften der Erwerbstätigen und welche Merk-
male der Arbeitsplätze bzw. der Berufe im Zusammenhang 
mit formaler und fähigkeitsbezogener Überqualifizierung 
stehen und c) welche Einkommenseinbußen mit qualifika-
torischem Mismatching unter Berücksichtigung der Unter-
schiede in der Ausnutzung der fachlichen Kenntnisse und 
Fähigkeiten der Erwerbstätigen verbunden sind. Die Unter-
suchung basiert dabei auf in Deutschland lebenden Kerner-
werbstätigen, d.h. Erwerbstätige, die einer bezahlten Arbeit 
von mindestens zehn Wochenstunden nachgehen.
Zunächst zeigen einfache deskriptive Auswertungen der 
beiden Passungsmaße, dass unter den 25 bis 64 Jahre alten 
Erwerbstätigen in Deutschland rund 71 Prozent im Hinblick 
auf ihre formalen Qualifikationen und 82 Prozent im Hin-
other countries, in Germany, the incidence of overqualifica-
tion (24.7 %) clearly outweighs the incidence of under-qual-
ification (10.1 %). Among overqualified workers, the largest 
group is overeducated workers (13.6 %). Approximately 8 % 
of all workers are under-challenged by the skill requirements 
of their jobs, but only 4.3 % are overeducated and overskilled. 
Equally, the incidence of under-qualification is highest from 
a credential perspective (approximately 8.4 %), whereas only 
3.3 % claim to be underskilled but not undereducated. With 
respect to all mismatching categories, having education and 
skills below the required level, is the most uncommon mis-
matching phenomenon in Germany (0.6 %). Thus, workers 
in Germany can be over- or underqualified in terms of for-
mal qualifications, even though their skills or abilities are 
perceived to be appropriate for the jobs for which they have 
been hired. Furthermore, there are workers who are perfectly 
matched with respect to their education, yet they feel under- 
or overchallenged by the skills requirements of their jobs. 
Random intercept models with worker, job, and occupation 
characteristics reveal that beyond worker characteristics, 
i.e., human capital compensation (heterogeneous ability) 
and career mobility rationalities, job characteristics help to 
explain mismatching and its real or apparent wage penalties. 
Our results suggest that, to some extent, mismatching is a 
real phenomenon in the German labor market.
Overall, this paper stresses the merits of the job require-
ment approach. With respect to the study of skill demand 
in general, research on mismatching greatly benefits from 
subjective measures on the skill content of jobs. Based on 
the results of job tasks, it would be worthwhile to study the 
link between polarization and mismatching using over time 
data. The Employment Survey is a repeated cross-sectional 
survey that allows for replicating some of the analyses 
presented above for data collections from 1979, 1985/86, 
1991/92, 1998/99 and 2012 (Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tie-
mann 2011). Ideally, however, to test for the occupational 
mobility hypothesis and to separate cohort from age effects, 
our analyses should be validated with panel data. A further 
extension would be to distinguish between subjects studied, 
testing whether overeducated workers are equally as able 
as matched workers, though they have degrees in subjects 
that are in less demand in the labor market (e.g., Green and 
McIntosh 2007). The analyses could be further extended by 
including specific occupation-level variables, e.g., indicat-
ing the occupation’s current labor market situation (unem-
ployment rates, regional distribution).
6  Kurzfassung
Der Beitrag untersucht anhand der BIBB/BAuA-Erwerb-
stätigenbefragung 2006 das Ausmaß von Fehlqualifizier-
ungen und damit verbundene Einkommenseinbußen in 
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sowie das Tätigkeitsprofil von Berufen berücksichtigt 
werden, sie bleiben aber dennoch in substantieller Größe 
bestehen. Die zentralen Befunde des Beitrags zeigen sich 
dabei sowohl für männliche als auch weiblich Erwerbstätige.
Insgesamt sprechen die Ergebnisse dafür, dass Fehl-
qualifizierung entgegen humankapitaltheoretischen Ansät-
zen und gemäß der Annahmen von Job Competition und 
Assignmenttheorien ein reales Phänomen in Deutschland 
darstellt. Insbesondere bietet der Tätigkeitsansatz Potential 
für neue Erkenntnisse zum Thema, die in weiteren Studien 
vertieft werden müssen. Für das Thema ergibt sich damit 
insgesamt auch im Hinblick auf die theoretische Fundierung 
ein weiterer Forschungsbedarf.
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blick auf ihre fachlichen Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten pas-
send beschäftigt sind. Überqualifizierungen sind bei beiden 
Passungsarten dabei das empirisch bedeutsamere Phän-
omen: 18,6 % sind formal über- und 10,1 % formal unter-
qualifiziert beschäftigt, 13,1 % sind im Hinblick auf ihre 
fachlichen Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten über- und nur 4,6 % 
unterqualifiziert beschäftigt. Im Hinblick auf a) zeigt sich, 
dass der Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Passungsvari-
ablen eher gering ist, d.h. qualifikatorisches und fähigkeits-
bezogenes Mismatching treten nicht immer gemeinsam auf. 
Demnach sind unter den formal fehlqualifizierten Beschäft-
igten in Deutschland zahlreiche Erwerbstätige, deren fachli-
che Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten den Anforderungen des 
Arbeitsplatzes entsprechen. Gleichzeitig haben nicht alle 
passend qualifizierten Beschäftigten die fachlichen Kennt-
nisse und Fähigkeiten, die auf ihrem jeweiligen Arbeitsplatz 
gefordert sind. Multivariate Random-Interceptmodelle 
für Erwerbstätige mit mindestens einer Berufsausbildung 
als höchstem Bildungsabschluss zeigen mit Bezug zu b), 
dass das Risiko von formaler Überqualifizierung stärker 
als bei fähigkeitsbezogener Überqualifizierung von Unter-
schieden zwischen Berufen herrührt und dass neben dem 
Humankapital und anderen Merkmalen der Individuen arbe-
itsplatzbezogene Eigenschaften in substantiellem Zusam-
menhang mit Fehlqualifizierung stehen. Insbesondere sinkt 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine nicht den qualifikatorischen 
bzw. den fachlichen Kenntnissen und Fähigkeiten gemäßen 
Beschäftigung mit der Bedeutung von analytischen Tätig-
keiten am Arbeitsplatz und ist geringer auf Arbeitsplätzen, 
deren fachliche Anforderungen in den letzten zwei Jahren 
gestiegen sind. Diese Befunde sind vereinbar mit der 
Annahme, dass Arbeitsplätze von überqualifiziert Beschäft-
igten durch höhere Anforderungen gekennzeichnet sind, als 
dass dies durch das formale Qualifikationsniveau beobacht-
bar ist. Entsprechend der aus den Überlegungen zur Arbe-
itskräftepolarisierung abgeleiteten Annahme einer höheren 
Überqualifizierung am unteren Ende der Qualifikationsver-
teilung zeigt sich, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit von formaler 
Überqualifizierung auf Arbeitsplätzen bzw. in Berufen 
mit einer hohen Bedeutung von nicht-routine manuellen 
Tätigkeiten gekennzeichnet ist. Random-Interceptmodelle 
des logarithmierten Stundenlohns erbringen mit Bezug zu 
c) schließlich, dass Lohneinbußen durch Überqualifizier-
ung auch dann zu beobachten sind, wenn die Passung der 
fachlichen Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten und weitere oft 
unbeobachtete Leistungsmerkmale wie die Tätigkeitserfah-
rung und der Gesundheitszustand berücksichtigt werden. 
Zudem gehen sie zwar in ihrer Höhe zurück, wenn weit-
ere lohnrelevante Personen- und Arbeitsplatzmerkmale 
(darunter die Leistungsanforderungen des Arbeitsplatzes) 
Table 8 Categorization of task items to ALM task groups for 2006 
cross-sectional analysis














High Increasing F312, F314
Routine 
cognitive
Medium Falling F307, F308
Routine 
manual




Low Constant/increasing F315, F316, F317
Alignments are initially based on a principal component analysis 
solution (for the study of task change in Germany over the period 
1979 to 2006 see Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann 2011). The 
variables of the first of the four factors are subsequently aligned 
to the analytical and interactive sub-categories, respectively. Items 
F309 and F319a are not included in the index because of their high 
loadings on more than one factor. The question posed in 2006 was 
‘how often do the following activities (random order) occur at work - 
frequently, sometimes, never’. The index is the worker’s sum of point 
values (2006: frequently = 1, sometimes = 0.5, never = 0; divided by 
the total number of activities in the respective task group
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